

25 Oct 73 Alert

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS 23 OCTOBER 1974(24)

American Threat To Put Troops in Sinai Is Denied

By Kenneth J. Freed
Associated Press

The United States threatened to send airborne troops into the Sinai Peninsula during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war if the Soviet Union intervened militarily in the conflict, Prof. Hans Morgenthau says.

The assertion, made yesterday to a group of reporters specializing in foreign affairs, was immediately denied by high State Department officials.

Morgenthau is a highly regarded political scientist in close touch with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, although the two are at odds on many policy issues.

MORGENTHAU said the United States "answered" a Soviet threat to send troops to enforce unilaterally an Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire "by saying we would send two divisions of paratroopers to the Sinai."

When asked his source for this statement, Morgenthau said he could not give the name, but said it was an "absolutely reliable" report. He then hinted that Kissinger was his source, saying the only source higher is "God."

The Russians backed down in the face of the American threat, Morgenthau said.

The officials who denied the report said the United States did not have two airborne divisions at the time, although they acknowledged that the 82nd Airborne Division was alerted as were most of the rest of the American military.

WHEN TOLD of the denials Morgenthau said in a

NEW YORK NEWS 24 OCTOBER 1974

First Lady Hurricane Hunter

By SIDNEY FIELDS

The experts tell us that in 1976 there will be a hurricane named Judy. Lt. Judith Ann Neuffer hopes to fly into it. Lt. Judy is the only female hurricane hunter in the U.S. Navy and probably the world. She was the first woman picked for pilot training by the Navy, which included jungle survival. A real trail blazer.

"I don't feel like one," she was saying during a brief furlough from Weather Reconnaissance Squadron 4, based in Jacksonville, Fla. "I grew up around planes."

Except she wasn't hassled by hurricanes before last June. Her summer was very busy. She flew into Alma, which never made it as a hurricane, missed Becky because her crew was on rest, had a high and uproarious time with Carmen, Dolly and Elaine, and had to miss Fifi and Gertrude.

As a Jenny-come-lately Judy is a P3, third pilot. Before she gets to be a P2 and an AC, Aircraft Commander, she needs 500 hours in the air as a hurricane hunter, plus an individual evaluation of her performance. She only has 150, but has logged 400 in other military planes. A hurricane flight lasts from 10 to 12 hours. The plane, a four-engined turbo prop Orion, weighs 110,000 pounds fully fueled, carries a crew of 13, including at least three pilots. Each is at the controls from 4 to 7 hours.

"We do have to stretch our legs," said Judy, who has a neat pair of gams in her mini-skirt uniform. She's 26, a rather reserved brown-eyed brunette with an upturned nose,

5'7", and a shapely 130 pounds.

When the National Hurricane Center radios Squadron 4 that a storm is brewing, they take off to investigate it. At 45 mph it's still a mere tropical storm; at 75 it's a hurricane. While the radar operator, with a picture of the hurricane on his radarscope, is leading the plane into it through its weakest areas, meteorologists and oceanographers are measuring wind velocities, temperatures, pressures. The pilot brings the plane in and out three times, a chore that lasts 6 hours. Each time the plane is in the eye the crew plots its position. With all the data collected they know the exact course the hurricane will take. Every town in its path is given an early warning.

"Before 1943," said Judy, "when the Navy organized its first weather squadron 400 people lost their lives for every \$10 million in hurricane damage. Now it's only one person for \$10 million in damage."

Each storm is different and unpredictable. (Is that why they have female names?) Pilots try to maintain a speed of 220 mph, not always easy with 200' to 300' downdrafts and updrafts.

"That's scary when we have to go in at 500 feet," said Judy. "Nothing much below you. But you can fly the Orion on one engine, and the crew is highly professional. The Navy lost only one weather plane, and it was an early version of the Orion. That was in 1955."

After one hurricane flight last summer the crew, on landing, were startled to see a sea gull imbedded in the leading edge of the wing.

Judy was at the controls for the season's worst hurricane, Carmen, which struck Mexico, then slammed into Louisiana at 175 mph, and surprisingly killed only two persons.

telephone interview that "I stand by my statement." He said, "I could have been misled" as to the number of divisions involved, "but there is no doubt a highly reliable source told me that."

Morgenthau also repeated a report current at the time of the war that the Soviet Union had sent nuclear warheads to Egypt to arm short-range SCUD ground-to-ground missiles deployed around Cairo.

Morgenthau, who now teaches at the New School in New York City, said this report was confirmed to him by the same source who told him of the paratrooper situation.

Morgenthau's remarks were made in the context of Kissinger's trip today to Moscow in pursuit of arms limitation agreements and general U.S.-Soviet detente.

ALTHOUGH crediting Kissinger and former President Richard M. Nixon with improving the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations, Morgenthau said detente was an otherwise illusionary policy.

Russia traditionally uses such high-sounding words as detente to mask its pursuit of "its own parochial interests," Morgenthau said.

Kissinger's use of such phrases is dangerous because he misleads the American people into thinking there is genuine relaxation of tensions when in reality Moscow still only reacts to confrontation.

Morgenthau was generally critical of Kissinger's diplomacy in the Middle East, saying the U.S. policy is not to save Israel but to eliminate Soviet influence among the Arab nations.

STILL, the professor expressed optimism about the future of Israel "because I am convinced" the secretary of state will fail in his diplomacy.

He explained that by saying Israel will not concede any more than it already has to the Arabs, Kissinger will "not be able to sell Israel down the river," and the United States will have to continue its support of Jerusalem.

Morgenthau said Kissinger probably won't be able to negotiate a meaningful strategic arms limitation agreement because there is no meaningful way to police a pact restricting missiles carrying multiple warheads.

"She was nasty when I flew into her the first time, and just as nasty the second and third time. She was alive for a long time."

She had her first plane ride as an infant, sitting in her mother's lap. Her father runs a small airport in Wooster, Ohio, Judy's hometown. He flew flights in Burma in World War II. At 10 Judy was fueling planes and sweeping hangars. She soloed at 16.

After earning a degree in computer science from Ohio State, Judy joined the Navy as a programmer with no idea of flying, but she jumped at it when the Navy let women apply for pilot training in Nov. 1972. She won her wings in Feb. 1974, and asked for hurricane duty, for which she gets no extra compensation beyond regular flight pay. Why volunteer?

"It was different, exciting and it does help people."

Women are restricted from flying military jets because jets are considered combat craft. "Hunting hurricanes is about all the combat I want," Judy said.

The hurricane season ends next month. During the lull before her squadron will be tracking down winter storms she'll have some time for scuba diving and sewing. She sews long evening dresses. As the only girl in a squadron of 200 men she's very popular.

"But only two of the 40 officers are bachelors."

When they saw the sea gull in the wing they agreed that Judy was at the controls. They forget the faulty landings they make, but when she makes one they say, "Judy, better get the crew to patch up the plane and the runway. Don't worry it will only take a few days."

"The kidding aside, they make me feel like one of them," Judy said. "They look out for me. We look out for each other. We have to."

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US Alert

WEDNESDAY MORNING, 21 NOVEMBER 1973

NEW YORK TIMES 21 NOVEMBER 1973 P-1

An Implied Soviet Threat Spurred U.S. Forces' Alert

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 20—The Soviet note that led to a precautionary alert of United States forces around the world on the night of Oct. 24 carried an implied threat rather than an actual threat of the dispatch of Soviet troops to the Suez war zone.

"We strongly urge that we both send forces to enforce the cease-fire and, if you do not, we may be obliged to consider acting alone," the Soviet note said, according to two officials who have read it.

A reconstruction of the cascading events of that night—many of which remain masked in secrecy—shows that the note from the Soviet leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, to President Nixon and the alert ordered by the Nixon Administration were only two of a series of firm signals exchanged in a complicated test of wills over the Middle East.

The exchanges lasted more than 12 hours, according to interviews with United States officials and Soviet, Israeli and European diplomats, but the crucial exchange—delivery of the Brezhnev note and the calling of the alert—took place in less than an hour, approximately between 10:40 and 11:30 P.M.

The alert was put into effect by 2:30 A.M., Oct. 25, officials said, and formally authorized by President Nixon half an hour later.

Only hours before the arrival of the Brezhnev note, the Nixon Administration had rejected two earlier plans for a joint United States-Soviet expeditionary force to enforce peace on the Suez front.

The first had come from President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt in a message read over the Cairo radio at about 3 P.M. on Oct. 24. The next, in the form of a message from Mr. Brezhnev, had been delivered at about 8 P.M. to Secretary of State Kissinger by Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin.

The crisis that Mr. Kissinger faced had been building up for several days.

On Oct. 16, Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin, on a hasty visit to Egypt, discovered that the Egyptian Army, in contrast with President Sadat's boasts, was near a state of collapse. In addition, the Egyptian III Corps, on the east bank of the Suez Canal opposite the city of Suez, faced encirclement by the Israelis as a result of the

Israeli crossing to the western bank early that morning.

Mr. Kosygin returned to Moscow Oct. 19 urging that the Soviet Government press for an immediate cease-fire in the Middle East war, which was then in its 14th day. Mr. Brezhnev thereupon invited President Nixon to send Mr. Kissinger to Moscow, and the Secretary arrived the next day.

In sessions Oct. 20 and 21 Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Brezhnev reached a compromise in which Moscow won its point that no time could be lost in achieving a cease-fire, while the Americans won their point of that the cease-fire must be linked to negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis.

The joint cease-fire proposal they agreed upon was adopted by the United Nations Security Council early Oct. 22, and the truce in place officially went into effect about 12 hours later.

Mr. Kissinger stopped in Israel on that day on his way home from Moscow. Four hours after he had left, Israeli forces went on to complete their encirclement of the Egyptian III Corps, an action he heard about later, reportedly with great dismay and a sense of betrayal.

While the Russians were said to have been outraged at what they regarded as a breach of their Oct. 21 understanding with the Americans, they also saw it as an opportunity to establish a large Soviet presence in the Middle East and they reportedly solicited President Sadat's Oct. 24 call for United States and Soviet troops.

A United States official familiar with the event said the original Brezhnev proposal on Oct. 24 for a joint United States-Soviet force for the Middle East made Mr. Kissinger apprehensive that tougher moments were ahead.

Mr. Kissinger was also getting what he later described as "puzzling" reports from the United Nations. There the Soviet representative, Yakov A. Malilik, had shifted suddenly from demanding a mere reaffirmation of the cease-fire resolution of Oct. 22—a reaffirmation was voted Oct. 23, and the new truce went into effect Oct. 24—to a resolution authorizing an expeditionary force for the Suez region, to a resolution authorizing a United States-Soviet expeditionary force.

The intelligence community, drawing principally on electronic surveillance of Soviet land, sea and air forces, had already noted the presence of seven landing craft and two ships with troop helicopters in eastern Mediterranean waters.

The landing craft had been there before. "milling around," as one intelligence official put it, recalling that a week before there had been eight landing craft in the eastern Mediterranean.

Troop Standby Monitored

Electronic surveillance had also monitored signals putting seven divisions of Soviet airborne troops—about 49,000 men—on a standby alert. One division had been placed on a higher level of alert during the day, making it ready to move out on call.

But, the intelligence official observed, there had been Soviet alerts before during the Middle East conflict, which began Oct. 6, and more Soviet landing craft in the region. So the activities of Soviet forces on Oct. 24 by themselves had caused no undue alarm at the Defense Department, one of the officials said.

Still the Soviet Air Force had pulled most of its large transports back from Damascus and Cairo to their home bases that day and some Pentagon official interpreted this as a sign that Moscow might use them to take Soviet troops, rather than Soviet weapons, to the Suez battle zone.

When the second Brezhnev note came at about 10:40 P.M. warning that the Soviet Union "may be obliged to consider acting alone," the responsible American officials—principally Secretary Kissinger and Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger—put that together with the electronic intelligence evidence and concluded that the Soviet Union was determined to put troops in the Middle East.

Suggestion to President

Describing the situation later, one of the Cabinet officials involved in the decision-making said of the second note and the intelligence estimates, "Either one, apart, we could have ignored."

Ambassador Dobrynin left the second note with Mr. Kissinger without obtaining a reply.

The Secretary of State immediately telephoned President Nixon, who was in his upper floor living quarters in the White House and suggested the United States response should be military as well as political, Mr. Nixon concurred.

This was the genesis of the United States alert.

President Nixon remained in charge throughout, his aides say, but he was also remote, staying the entire night in his White House apartment and receiving the telephone messages of Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger. Mr. Nixon empowered them to manage the crisis on their own, the Cabinet official said, leaving them to conceive and carry out the various moves.

Mr. Kissinger convened a meeting of what Mr. Schlesinger later termed "the abbreviated National Security Coun-

cil" in the austere, map-filled Situation Room in the White House basement.

It was abbreviated in part because the chairman of what had been a six-man panel, President Nixon, was upstairs. Mr. Kissinger was there in his dual capacity as Secretary of State and the President's assistant for national security affairs.

Another chair was empty because Spiro T. Agnew had resigned, and there was no director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness since George A. Lincoln had retired 14 months before.

"Officially the meeting consisted of Kissinger, Kissinger and Schlesinger," a council aide commented.

Attending as the intelligence adviser was William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, whose agency had played a major role in handling the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and was now on the sidelines. Mr. Colby had been called in belatedly.

The C.I.A. was familiar with the electronic intelligence obtained by its powerful sister agency, the National Security Agency, but it was not apprised of the Soviet notes until Mr. Colby arrived at the White House.

Haig's Role Described

Attending as the military adviser was Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Schlesinger had been told of the second Soviet note by Alexander M. Haig Jr., chief of the White House staff. He, in turn, called Admiral Moorer. General Haig functioned more as a go-between than as a member of the decision-making group, aides said.

The abbreviated National Security Council met at about 11 P.M. and Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger swiftly agreed on a modified alert as the United States military response designed to persuade the Soviet Union against acting alone.

The technical term for the alert is Defense Condition 3, explained by a Pentagon official as "an order to stand by for further orders that may come." It is an order any area commander can issue without higher authority if he feels his forces may be threatened.

Mr. Schlesinger is said to have issued it at 11:30 P.M., and it was passed to the service chiefs by Admiral Moorer.

While the service chiefs were aware of the movements of Soviet military units, they were said to be so surprised by the diplomatic messages that they sent an aide to the C.I.A. and the State Department to seek further word on Soviet intentions. He apparently returned empty-handed.

The Washington order alerted most but not all United States forces. The Coast Guard, with its vital air-sea rescue system, was not brought in until 12 hours later. Strategic Air Command tanker planes hovering along the United States-to-Israel airlift route were left in

(See ALERT Page 4)

WEDNESDAY MORNING, 21 NOVEMBER 1973

NEW YORK TIMES 21 NOVEMBER 1973 P-16

KISSINGER MEETS WITH SENATE UNIT

He Says U.S. Is Still Hoping
Mideast Peace Talks Will

Start in Mid-December
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 20—Secretary of State Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today that the United States still hoped—despite some Israeli qualms—to start the Middle East peace conference around the middle of next month.

In a closed session, Mr. Kissinger also discussed with the committee members the basic goals of what the United States would like to see emerge from a Middle East settlement, but without detailing any American peace plan, Senate sources said.

According to the sources, Mr. Kissinger said that the Nixon Administration wanted the final agreement to reflect the desire of the Arab nations to regain control over the territory lost to Israel in 1967, while at the same time giving Israel assurances that her security will not be jeopardized by the loss of the occupied territory.

Briefing on Trip

Mr. Kissinger met with the committee for two and a half hours to discuss his recent round-the-world trip to the Middle East and the Far East and to exchange views with committee members on efforts to get a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Arab countries.

After the session Mr. Kissinger told newsmen, "We reviewed not only the cease-fire agreement but where we hope to go in the peace negotiation and the various elements involved."

In answer to a question, he said, "We don't have a specific plan, but we have a number of principles which we feel will have to be included in a settlement."

Asked whether he had a date for the start of the talks, in which Israel, Egypt and Syria have indicated they would participate, Mr. Kissinger repeated what officials have said recently: "We hope to get them started in the next few weeks." A well-informed source said "good speculation" would be Dec. 17 for the opening date, in Geneva.

Fulbright Is Hopeful

Senator J. W. Fulbright, the committee chairman, said after the meeting, "I think the prospects for a settler are better than they have been for the last 30 years." But the Arkansas Democrat warned that negotiations would not be easy.

He stressed that the main points of any settlement would have to insure Israel's security while at the same time returning all but "insubstantial" territory to the Arab nations. This

was to be reported to be Mr. Kissinger's position also.

To provide Israel with the necessary incentives, Mr. Fulbright said, it might be useful to have an Israeli-American security treaty, an idea he suggested four years ago. Mr. Kissinger said in Peking last week that such a treaty was under consideration as a way of guaranteeing Israel's boundaries. But Mr. Fulbright said that a security treaty would be only one ingredient in a settlement.

Time Called Propitious

according to a Senate source. Mr. Kissinger spoke in broad terms about the need for a firm, permanent settlement between Israel and the Arabs, stressing his view that the time was propitious for an accord.

He also said again that the talks would be held under Soviet-American auspices because no agreement would be workable unless the two major powers with interests in the area were in accord on the settlement and would offer the necessary guarantees.

Mr. Kissinger apparently impressed several members who said that he not only offered his own views, but seemed to listen to those of the Senators as well.

Senator Clifford Case, Republican of New Jersey, asserted afterward that Mr. Kissinger said it was important to get the United Nations forces in place between the Israeli and Egyptian forces so that neither side would be tempted to resort to arms while the negotiations were going on.

Israelis Favor Later Date

The Israeli Government has been less than enthusiastic about beginning peace talks next month because the parliamentary election is scheduled for Dec. 31.

The Israelis have said that they would prefer the talks to begin in January. The Egyptians have been pressing for a start as soon as possible, with some reports from Cairo speaking of Dec. 10. But a North Atlantic Treaty Organization meeting will be held in Brussels on Dec. 10 and 11, and Mr. Kissinger is to attend that session.

He said that he would like to be present for the start of the Middle East talks. This has led his aides to think that Dec. 17 would be a reasonable starting date, with the likelihood of a recess soon after to allow the Israelis to have their election and possibly prepare a new position.

Mr. Kissinger plans to hold a news conference tomorrow afternoon.

ALERT--CONTINUED

their Middle Atlantic patterns rather than sent north for possible fueling of long-range B-52 bombers.

Mr. Schlesinger returned to the Pentagon about 1:30 A.M. to bolster the alert by ordering the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean with her A-4 fighter-bombers and telling the 15,000-man 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, N. C., to get ready to board transport craft.

Asked if the Soviet Union had been notified of the alert, a United States official said: "No, the alert itself was a signal which we knew they would get through their own electronic intelligence."

Heightened United States military activity could clearly be discerned through the amount and nature of the radio traffic, it was said.

Mr. Kissinger was busy, meanwhile, on the diplomatic front. He conferred repeatedly from the outset of the American-Soviet exchanges with Israel's Ambassador, Simcha Dinitz, advising him of Soviet and United States moves.

About 1 A.M. he told the British Ambassador, the Earl of Cromer, of the note and the alert. Other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were informed through the mechanism of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, which was advised of the alert by the Defense Department about 2 A.M. Pentagon officials say the news went out to the alliance capitals much later because of a foul-up in the Brussels communication machinery.

In retrospect, however, associates of Mr. Kissinger acknowledge that the crisis-managers "botched" the job of promptly informing United States allies on the night's actions.

"We could have called up all the top allies," said a United States official. "But it might have meant delaying the alert."

Mr. Kissinger was also in touch with the United States delegate to the United Nations, John A. Scali, who had just been through some bruising exchanges with Mr. Malik.

The Soviet delegate had accused the United States of allowing Israel to violate the cease-fire of Oct. 22 and make territorial gains.

Through Mr. Scali, Mr. Kissinger was working to get the Soviet Union to agree to a new resolution in the Security Council setting up a peace-keeping force for the disputed Suez region.

Reply to Brezhnev Drafted

Finally, Mr. Kissinger drafted a reply to the last Brezhnev note saying the United States would not tolerate a unilateral action by the Soviet Union, hoped that Moscow would not take that course, and warned that any such move would damage the cause of peace. He also called for joint action in the United Nations.

That done, according to an aide, a weary Mr. Kissinger walked upstairs and reported to President Nixon and obtained his "ratification" of the moves, including the second note to Mr. Brezhnev. It was about 3 A.M. on Oct. 25, three and a half hours after the alert had been called.

At his news conference at noon, the Secretary publicly reminded Moscow that both the Soviet Union and the United States had nuclear arsenals "capable of annihilating humanity," but that they also had "a special duty to see to it that confrontations are kept within bounds."

An hour or so later, both countries joined in the 14-to-0 vote by which the United Nations Security Council decided to establish a United Nations peace-keeping force excluding the major powers—a move that in effect brought the American-Soviet exchanges to an end.

And in those exchanges, officials noted, the hot-line teletype machine that connects Washington and Moscow was never used.

N. Y. TIMES 11/21/73 Dartmouth Plans a Review

On Restoration of R.O.T.C.

HANOVER, N. H., Nov. 20 (AP) — Trustees of Dartmouth College have authorized a "thorough review" of the advisability and feasibility of restoring the Reserve Officer Training Corps to the campus.

In an interview yesterday on the campus radio station, Dartmouth's president, John G. Kemeny, said the trustees merely wanted to begin a fact-finding study of the pros and cons among the student body. The trustees, who met during last weekend, asked for a report within one year.

In the spring of 1969 the trustees followed a recommendation of the faculty of Arts and Sciences and voted to phase out R.O.T.C. on campus by June, 1973.

WASHINGTON POST 21 NOV. 1973 P-6 Military Funds

The Senate approved 88 to 9, a \$2.7 billion appropriations bill to fund construction of military facilities in the United States and abroad.

The bill is \$273.9 million below the administration request but \$61.8 million more than a House-passed bill. The difference will have to be compromised by Senate-House negotiators.

The Senate added \$12 million to permit the Navy to proceed with relocation of its Culbra weapons range in Puerto Rico to an uninhabited island.

WASHINGTON POST - 21 NOVEMBER 1973 P-3

Rickover's promotion

Washington (P)—Vice Adm. Hyman G. Rickover, called the father of America's nuclear Navy, has been promoted to admiral on the retired list.

President Nixon signed a defense procurement bill Monday that contained an amendment sponsored by

Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.), promoting Admiral Rickover.

Admiral Rickover, 73, is director of the Atomic Energy Commission's division of naval reactors and deputy commander of the naval ships system command for nuclear propulsion in the Defense Department.

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1835 :MIDEAST--NOTE:

NEW YORK, OCT. 23, REUTER--THE SOVIET UNION THREATENED THE "DESTRUCTION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL" BY RUSSIAN TROOPS UNLESS ISRAEL STOPPED VIOLATING THE MIDDLE EAST CEASEFIRE LAST WEEK, TIME MAGAZINE SAID TODAY.

TIME SAID THE THREAT WAS CONTAINED IN A SECRET NOTE SENT TO PRESIDENT NIXON BY SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY CHIEF LEONID BREZHNEV.

THE CONTENTS OF THE NOTE HAVE NOT BEEN REVEALED BY THE WHITE HOUSE BUT SENATOR HENRY JACKSON (D.-WASH.) EARLIER DESCRIBED ITS CONTENTS AS "BRUTAL."

"INSTEAD OF BEGINNING IN THE USUAL DIPLOMATIC SALUTATION 'DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,' IT STARTED OUT WITH A HARSHER 'MR. NIXON'," TIME SAID.

ALTHOUGH TIME DID NOT ELABORATE ON THE THREAT OF THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL, IT SAID THE SOVIET UNION MADE SIMILAR WARNINGS NEAR THE END OF THE 1967 MIDDLE EAST WAR BUT PRESIDENT LYNDON JOHNSON "CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT THEY NEVER INTENDED TO ACT AND IGNORED THEM."

:: REUTER DJN/MAC

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DESTROY 10-28

NEW YORK (UPI) -- TIME MAGAZINE REPORTED SUNDAY IT HAS LEARNED THAT THE NOTE SENT BY SOVIET PARTY CHIEF LEONID BREZHNEV TO PRESIDENT NIXON IN THE MIDEAST CRISIS "THREATENED THE DESTRUCTION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL" BY SOVIET FORCES IF ISRAEL "DID NOT STOP VIOLATING THE CEASEFIRE."

TEXT OF THE NOTE FROM BREZHNEV, WHICH PRECEDED NIXON'S ACTION IN PLACING U.S. ARMED FORCES IN A STATE OF ALERT LAST WEEK, HAS NOT BEEN REVEALED. NIXON, IN HIS NEWS CONFERENCE FRIDAY, SAID THAT BREZHNEV "LEFT VERY LITTLE TO THE IMAGINATION WHAT HE INTENDED." THE NOTE HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY SEN. HENRY JACKSON (D-WASH.) AS "BRUTAL."

TIME SAID IT ALSO HAS LEARNED THAT THE NOTE BEGAN "MR. NIXON" INSTEAD OF THE USUAL DIPLOMATIC "DEAR MR. NIXON."

THE MAGAZINE SAID ONE MEMBER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE LATE PRESIDENT LYNDON JOHNSON RECALLED THAT THE SOVIETS MADE SIMILAR HARSH THREATS "TOWARD THE END" OF THE 1967 SIX-DAY WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS BUT "JOHNSON CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT THEY NEVER INTENDED TO ACT AND IGNORED THEM."

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WASHINGTON POST

2 MAY 1974

Press Reporting '73 Soviet Alert

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

In a crossfire of alleged Soviet-Egyptian disclosures of secret dealings between Moscow and Cairo, the Soviet Union is reported boasting that it mobilized seven Russian divisions to fight for Egypt last October.

These published reports now rebounding across the Middle East cannot be independently authenticated. If verified, they would be the first Soviet admission of what the United States charged was happening, resulting in the American global military alert the night of Oct. 24-25 during the Arab-Israeli war.

At the time, the Soviet Union accused the United States of "absurd" attempts "to intimidate the Soviet Union" by contriving a global alarm. President Nixon, on Oct. 26, claimed the crisis was "the most difficult we have had since the Cuban (nuclear missile) confrontation of

1962." Privately, many U.S. officials believed the President overstated the crisis, but that a threat did exist at the time.

U.S. officials are intrigued by the claims that are now tumbling out as Egypt, in a dramatic shift of position, is openly turning closer to the United States, to the dismay of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, in turn, is appealing over the head of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to try to demonstrate that it has been loyal to Arab nationalism.

Much of what is being said on both sides "has the ring of authenticity to it" and basically "is credible" when compared with information known to American intelligence, U.S. sources said yesterday. However, "this is a propaganda brawl" between the Russians and the Sadat regime, a specialist noted, and "both sides

See DISCLOSE, A7, Col. 1

DISCLOSE, From A1

undoubtedly are stretching the truth."

The most revealing "disclosures" are appearing in the Lebanese press; in Beirut, a great variety of publications with various shadings of political objectives supply a ready market for any point of view.

On April 16, the newspaper *As Safir*, which U.S. officials regard as an anti-Western, pro-Libyan organ, published what was described as "the text of a statement by former Soviet Ambassador in Cairo Vladimir Vinogradov," made to "a number of Egyptian official and political personalities." Vinogradov is now the Soviet ambassador in Geneva for the Middle East peace talks.

The *As Safir* article came to the attention of officials in Washington when it was reprinted, next day, by the Beirut newspaper *An Nida*, which American sources say is a Communist organ supporting the line of the Soviet Communist Party. *An Nida* said, "As Safir has obtained an important document which contains the Soviet Union's views and what happened during the October war," which began on Oct. 6, 1973.

Its account of the October alert, attributed to Vinogradov, is as follows:

"In the early hours of 20 October, at exactly 0300, President Sadat contacted me and asked me to convey an urgent message on the situation to Brezhnev and to ask him to intervene to achieve an immediate cease-fire.

"(As I learned later, Syria did not want to have a cease-fire at that time because it was on the verge of launching its big counter-offensive.) (parenthesis as published.)

"I contacted Moscow. The director of the office informed me that Comrade Brezhnev had gone to bed only one hour before and that he could not wake him up. I asked him to wake him up on my responsibility. I informed Brezhnev of the situation as explained by President Sadat and of his re-

"The Soviet leaders immediately issued a decision for a partial alert of the Soviet forces. Seven Soviet military divisions were mobilized and put on the ready to be taken to fight on the Egyptian front. In fact, an advance group arrived in Cairo."

"According to the document, Vinogradov concluded his talk with a number of Egyptian official and political personalities by saying: We all know the story of the days that followed, the Israeli anguish over the cease-fire, the Soviet threat of unilateral intervention and the contacts with the United States until the achievement of the final cease-fire on 26 October."

In earlier portions, the alleged statement by Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov states that he saw President Sadat "daily from 4 to 29 October," and there "were no acrimonious debates or differences of any kind" between them.

"On 4 October," two days before Egypt launched its surprise attack on Israeli forces across the Suez Canal, the report says, "President Sadat informed me of Egypt's decision that it had no course before it now except war."

"Naturally, the president did not specify the day he had chosen for the war, but merely said that the matter had been decided. He asked me to convey the Egyptian attitude, decision and its urgent requirements to the Soviet leadership... The answer was that the war decision was an Egyptian decision and that the Soviet Union would fulfill its commitments and would support the Arab right with all military, political and economic means."

According to the account, on Oct. 6, after Egyptian forces succeeded in quickly crossing

the Suez Canal and piercing Israel's Bar-Lev line in the Sinai desert, Vinogradov told Sadat that Moscow had informed him of a communication from Syria. That message reportedly said that "a few days before the outbreak of fighting," Syrian President Hafez Assad "had informed the Soviet leadership that Syria and Egypt were about to enter an all-out military confrontation with Israel..."

Syria was said to have asked the Soviet Union "to make a quick move" to get international agreement on a cease-fire "within 48 hours" from the outbreak of fighting. On Oct. 6, however, the account continued, Sadat told Vinogradov that "it was too early" to call for a cease-fire. On Oct. 9, the report said, Syria again urged a cease-fire; Sadat again demurred.

On Oct. 16, however, after Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal and threatened to penetrate deeply into Egypt, the account states, Sadat conferred with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in Cairo and it was agreed that the Soviet Union would begin "contacts to obtain a cease-fire."

"Kosygin returned to Moscow, called Kissinger," the report continues, "and the efforts to obtain a cease-fire began." It was after a cease-fire call was agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union that the alert crisis began, out of Soviet-Egyptian concern that the Israeli forces would not halt their advance.

A separate, lengthier account of the history of Egyptian-Soviet relations was received in Washington on Tuesday, in the form of an interview with President Sadat published in the Lebanese weekly, Al Hawadith. The undated interview was reportedly given to Al Hawadith's publisher, Salim Al Hawzi.

Sadat is quoted as saying, "I am eager not to sever the thread with the Soviets" now, even though Sadat expressed considerable dismay with Soviet behavior.

After Israel's victory over the Arabs in the six-day 1967 war, Sadat said in the account, the Soviet Union came to Egypt's aid when "everything on the land of Egypt was bleeding," and Egypt had "neither planes nor air bases" left.

Egypt "had absolute confidence in the Russians" then, said Sadat, and even asked them "to appoint a Soviet commander for the Egyptian air force," but "they refused."

The Soviet Union supplied Egypt initially with all military requirements it needed, Sadat said, but then President Gamal Abdel Nasser told Yugoslavian President Josip Broz Tito that the Russian "method was rough..." In 1972, Sadat said, he made "the decision to expel the Soviet (military) experts and then the decision to abolish (Soviet) custodianship," because neither Nasser "nor myself could accept anyone pulling the strings behind our backs."

In March, 1971, said Sadat, during a secret trip to Moscow, when the Russians refused to send certain aircraft unless they could control their use, "something snapped between me and them..."

Sadat said that "Egypt's decision to launch the battle (in the October, 1973 war) was against the will of the two superpowers" (the Soviet Union and the United States). Even now, said Sadat, when Egypt has repaired relations with the United States, "the relations between us and the Soviets have not reached the breaking point. All that we want... is to establish clear, frank and equal relations."

ME: US Aurl

HOUSE ENDS STUDY OF OCTOBER ALERT

Data on Action by Nixon in
Mideast Crisis Called Too

Sensitive for Release

NYT, 10 APR 74

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 9—The House of Representatives voted early today to end further inquiry into the worldwide American military alert ordered by President Nixon at the height of the Middle East war last fall.

On Oct. 24 a note from the Soviet Union was given to Secretary of State Kissinger at a time when Israeli forces were poised to attack forces of the Egyptian Third Army, then stranded on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Together with what the Nixon Administration described as "ambiguous" Soviet troop movements, the note indicated what President Nixon called "the most difficult crisis we have had since the Cuban confrontation of 1962."

The key paragraph of the note signed by the Soviet Communist leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, was recently provided to The New York Times. It read:

"I will say it straight, that if you find it impossible to act with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally. Israel cannot be permitted to get away with the violations."

Allegations Against Israel

The term "violations" referred to allegations that the Israelis had failed to heed United Nations resolutions directing an immediate cease-fire. The day after the alert went into effect, the Administration portrayed the note as threatening unilateral military intervention.

The note immediately became a subject of domestic political controversy when Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, described it as brutal. He implied that the Administration's response had been inadequate.

Others attacked from the opposite side, arguing that the Administration had overreacted. The implication here was that it was trying to show that the President could act even in time of domestic trouble.

Two in the latter category, Representatives Michael J. Har-

Two in the latter category, Representatives Michael J. Harrington of Massachusetts and Fortney H. Stark of California, both Democrats, presented a resolution of inquiry that called on Mr. Kissinger to furnish all the relevant information on the alert and the note.

Response by Kissinger

Mr. Kissinger responded to a later request by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in three forms: He allowed the chairman, Thomas E. Morgan, Democrat of Pennsylvania, and three committee members to read the note and report generally on its contents to the rest of the committee; he provided intelligence information on Soviet troop movements; he provided an unclassified account along with a chronology of Administration decisions during the crisis.

The committee voted, 26 to 2, last week, that Mr. Kissinger's response was sufficient and that the information was such that the national interest required that it not be made public.

The co-sponsors of the resolution disagreed, terming the information skeletal, and took the issue to the floor, where they were overwhelmingly defeated in a voice vote.

Officials provided additional information about the Soviet note, which was typed in English and consisted of four paragraphs.

The first stated that Israel continued to ignore the cease-fire orders and that this represented a challenge to the Soviet Union and the United States.

The second paragraph insisted on the need to "implement" the resolutions and "invited" Washington to join Moscow "to compel observance of the cease-fire without delay."

The third paragraph, quoted above, proposed Soviet military action if Washington declined to act jointly.

In the final paragraph Mr. Brezhnev told Mr. Nixon: "I value our relationship." The note began simply "Mr. President," not the usual salutation, "My Dear Mr. President."

45 Alert DIR 22 NIC



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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 1974

WASHINGTON POST
10 April 1974 Pg. 20

Warsaw Pact Talks Announced

By Vincent Buist
Reuter

MOSCOW, April 9—Party and government leaders of the seven Warsaw Pact states are to meet in the Polish capital this month to discuss security issues and are likely to issue an appeal for accelerated East-West détente.

The Soviet Tass news agency today announced that a meeting of the Political and Consultative Committee of the East European defense alliance would take place in the middle of April in Warsaw but gave no dates or additional information.

Member states are the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria.

Warsaw Pact meetings normally would take place in the last two days and are attended by leaders of Communist parties and prime ministers, accompanied by defense ministers and other experts.

Over the past 10 years they have sometimes marked a watershed in East bloc policies, signifying Kremlin assent to such notable steps as agreement on a partial nuclear test ban.

It is customary to issue a communique outlining Soviet bloc proposals for further measures to achieve cooperation and disarmament.

The last Warsaw Pact meeting in Prague, in January, 1972, called for a European security conference to banish force in international relations and fix for all time existing European post-war frontiers. This conference is now approaching its final stage.

Recent official Moscow comment suggests that the Vienna talks on force reductions in Central Europe between the Warsaw Pact and the West's NATO alliance will rank high up in the coming discussions by East bloc leaders in Warsaw.

They may also renew their appeal for the European security conference to wind up with a summit meeting. Western leaders have so far balked at this proposal because they

WARSAW PACT...Page 2

BALTIMORE SUN 10 April 1974 Pg. 1

Rule clashes with admirals over shipbuilding program

By CHARLES W. CORDDRY
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Gordon W. Rule, the Navy's maverick top-ranking civil servant, urged Congress yesterday to slow down a shipbuilding program that eventually may cost \$1.5 billion until the service can find out whether the ships' missile and gun fire-control systems are going to work.

The uniformed Navy, speaking through Vice Adm. Frank H. Price, Jr., director of ship acquisition and improvement, answered that the patrol frigate and armament programs are on schedule and, in effect, that Mr. Rule did not know what he was talking about.

Admiral Price, who works for Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., the chief of naval operations, conceded under questioning, however, that Adm. Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., the chief of naval material has been "worried" about the "tight" schedule on which Admiral Zumwalt wants the new-type ships built.

As director of procurement control and the Navy's senior civil service contracting employee, Mr. Rule works for Admiral Kidd and he represented that Admiral Kidd had tried unavailingly to get Admiral Zumwalt to slow the ship delivery dates.

At issue is a Navy undertaking to build a fleet of 50 patrol frigates, a new design for protecting the sea lanes. Much smaller than present escorts, they are to have a Dutch fire-control system and Italian guns because, Admiral Price said, no American systems were available that could meet desired specifications.

Admiral Price, an ordnance engineer, said he had followed closely work on the proposed armament for the patrol frigates and had "seen nothing that would lead me to believe the system will not be developed essentially on 'time' and perform as intended."

Mr. Rule said there was currently no plan for testing the fire-control system and gun adequately before going into production and he feared they

RULE...Page 2

NEW YORK NEWS 10 April 1974 Pg. 18

Testifies on Army's Secret Data Banks

By JOSEPH VOLZ

Washington, April 9 (News Bureau) — A former Army official testified today that the military set up top-secret computer banks of intelligence information in the 1960s, but that they were filled with "a lot of unevaluated junk."

Robert E. Jordan, former army general counsel, told a Senate Judiciary subcommittee that the intelligence information, stored at Fort Holabird, Md. and Fortress Monroe, Va., even included a biography of "one of the staff members in the general counsel's office—after we were assured that no such compilation existed."

Among the material, which Jordan said "had an enormous potential for abuse," were reports on two highly rated officers—a Special Forces colonel

and a major general who commanded a division.

Jordan said the information included an "ideological code which cast doubt on their loyalty to the United States."

Observing that the data banks were kept secret from the Army's top civilian officials, Jordan still insisted that the press overplayed the abuses.

Military snooping on civilians began during the period of ghetto rioting and mass anti-war demonstrations in the late 1960s. Jordan denied that the spying was a threat to civil liberties.

WASHINGTON POST 10 April 1974 Pg. 1

House Halts Bid For Alert Data

United Press International

The House yesterday killed a resolution demanding information on President Nixon's controversial military alert order during the Middle East war last October.

On a voice vote, the House tabled the resolution introduced by Reps. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.) and Fortney (Pete) Stark (D-Calif.) after Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger failed to provide Congress with the information.

The resolution would have required Kissinger to turn over the text of all the messages between Mr. Nixon and Soviet officials and a list and chronology of all the orders and actions taken during the crisis last Oct. 24-25.

The House agreed with the Foreign Affairs Committee, which disapproved the meas-

ure 26 to 2, that most of the information was sensitive and in the national interest should not be released now.

In his response to the committee, Kissinger said he did not believe public airing of the information "would contribute toward the goal of peace which we all seek."

"Despite the considerable progress made in the Middle East since November, the situation there remains delicate."

"In our view, resurrecting the October episode now might well impair the progress achieved thus far."

In an unclassified summary of what happened during the crisis, Kissinger said an "unusually tough" letter from Soviet Communist Party chief

ALERT DATA...Page 2

PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE (SAFAA) AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY

DOD PERSONNEL MATTERS WITHIN THEIR OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

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Ervin: Military Still Spying on Civilians

By PAUL CLANCY
Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—The military, which ordered an end to civilian intelligence gathering three years ago, is still occasionally spying on private citizens, Sen. Sam Ervin (D., N. C.) said Tuesday.

Although the level of information-gathering is nowhere near what it was previously, Ervin cited several examples to show that the military, especially the Army, is still very much in the business.

The only cure, Ervin said, is not self-restraint by the armed forces but legislation.

Meanwhile, FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley said on television that individuals should be allowed to inspect the FBI's files on them as long as the agency's informants are protected.

Kelley also said he approved of former director J. Edgar Hoover's tactics aimed at disrupting "New Left" activities in the last few years of his long tenure. But Kelley said such tactics would not be used again.

"It was felt something had to be done," he said, because of bombings and violence. He said the strategy worked because the widespread violence ended.

Directive Issued

Ervin opened two days of hearings on his proposed Freedom from Surveillance Act that would make it a crime for any military officer to spy on civilians or collect information about their beliefs, associations or political activities unless ordered to do so by the President to repel invasions or suppress insurrections.

Investigations by Ervin's Constitutional Rights subcommittee in early 1971 disclosed that the military was engaged in massive and unrestrained surveillance of controversial persons and groups to keep abreast of potential urban riots and campus unrest.

The Defense Department issued a directive on March 1, 1971, ordering the dismantling of the operations and the destruction of all files and computer tapes that contained information about civilians.

But, despite this directive, Ervin said, the subcommittee

has learned that a number of activities it considers questionable have occurred. Among them:

- The participation by the military in the Justice Department's now-defunct Intelligence Evaluation Committee, even though the IEC had far broader interests than civil disturbances.

- The assignment of military intelligence agents to both the Republican and Democratic conventions in Miami in 1972 in the event Federal troops were needed to deal with riots.

Speech Monitored

Ervin said one of his own speeches was monitored by the Army. It was during January 1970, when the Statesville, N.C., branch of the NAACP picketed an armory where Ervin was giving an anti-busing speech.

There were only six demonstrators there to "peacefully deplore my speech," Ervin said.

He said the subcommittee has also discovered that a majority of the military installations inspected by the Defense Department's own review council still maintained files on civilians and civilian groups.

ALERT DATA... Continued

Leonid Brezhnev which followed movement of Soviet ships into the Mediterranean led to Mr. Nixon's decision to put U.S. forces on full alert.

"It was essential to clear up any doubt about U.S. determination in this situation and prepare to cope with the quickly unfolding events," he said.

Kissinger promised shortly after the incident last fall to provide Congress with the material, much of it classified, but had not done so by March 25 when Harrington and Stark introduced their resolution.

Rep. H.R. Gross (R-Iowa), who voted to table the resolution both in the committee and in the House, nevertheless put the President and the State Department "on notice" that Congress was entitled to such information more quickly in the future.

"Never again should members of Congress permit themselves, for lack of reliable information, to be sucked into a war as they were in Southeast Asia," Gross said.

WARSAW PACT... Continued

feel modest progress in key areas of European detente and security—such as free flow of ideas, information and people—do not warrant a top-level meeting.

But Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev who has consistently called for a top-level meeting still hopes to attend a European summit in Helsinki this year.

RULE... Continued

"won't work properly when they get to the shipyard."

He urged the sea power and research and development subcommittees of the Armed Services Committee to take neither his nor the admiral's word on the risks involved but, rather, to get an independent judgment, perhaps from the General Accounting Office.

"You can make up your own minds whether I'm a damn fool," Mr. Rule said. "I thought this one (the frigate program) was so bad it had to be illuminated."

One of the ironies in the present Rule-versus-admirals conflict—there have been many before—is that Mr. Rule professes to be working hand-in-glove with Admiral Kidd against the strong-willed Admiral Zumwalt. Admiral Kidd's domain is the vast development and procurement system that turns out the ships, aircraft and equipment for Admiral Zumwalt's fleets.

After one of Mr. Rule's uprisings in late 1972, Admiral Kidd first tried to get him to retire and, failing that, exiled him for a time to a job of revising the curriculum of a Navy management school. They are getting along well now, by Mr. Rule's account.

The current controversy was stimulated by a letter Mr. Rule wrote to Senator John C. Stennis (D. Miss.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, proposing, among other things, a slowdown in the frigate program. The letter, claiming the handling of the program was "almost criminal," leaked into print and the House hearing was one result.

In his letter, Mr. Rule said Admiral Kidd had urged Admiral Zumwalt to slow the ship delivery schedules and "completely level with the Congress by informing them the navy may not need (Patrol Frigate) shipbuilding money until a later fiscal year while we take the time to prove out the two systems of Americanized foreign hardware"—the fire-control system and the gun.

The Navy has requested \$436.5 million in its new budget—for the year starting July 1—to order seven of the frigates. The lead ship of the class already is on order from Bath Iron Works, Bath, Maine.

Yesterday's subcommittee questioning showed no strong indication that members favor slowing the shipbuilding enterprise.

NEW YORK TIMES 10 April 1974 Pg. 4

90 Civilians Seized In Vietcong Raids, South Vietnam Says

SAIGON, South Vietnam, April 9 (Reuters)—The Saigon Government said today that 90 civilians were kidnapped by the Vietcong yesterday and last night at the Michelin rubber plantation and in five Mekong delta villages.

The vast French-owned plantation, 40 miles northwest of Saigon, has long been a Vietcong base area. The manager said recently that only 20 per cent of the rubber trees were being tapped and those in areas authorized by the Vietcong.

The reported large-scale kidnapping from a village on the edge of the plantation in daylight yesterday appeared to mark a change of Vietcong policy in the area where there has been little fighting and a

clear accommodation between the two sides since the cease-fire.

Kidnappings on Rise

Kidnappings in the Mekong delta have been increasing for some months but the abduction of about 30 people from five villages was unusually high, according to police sources.

Work at the Michelin plantation was stopped today in protest against the kidnapping involving 44 women and 17 children, company sources said.

The women and children—a tenth of the work force of tree tappers—were led away by Vietcong troops yesterday morning, and have not been seen since, the police said.

The sources said the company was sending word to the Communists in the plantation to let them know that the factory had been closed. An official said: "We're fed up. They have got to leave us in peace and send these people back immediately."

MONDAY MORNING, 26 NOVEMBER 1973

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BALTIMORE SUN

26 NOVEMBER 1973

Saigon Planes Said to Step Up Attack On Communist Areas North of Capital

By JAMES M. MARKHAM
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Nov. 24—The South Vietnamese Air Force has staged further large air strikes against Communist-held areas northwest of Saigon, military sources reported today.

The raids on Katum and Thien Ngon airfields in northern Tay Ninh Province yesterday morning were among the heaviest since the January ceasefire, the South Vietnamese sources said, with fighter-bomber pilots logging about 100 missions.

One F-5 fighter-bomber was struck by antiaircraft fire and its pilot was presumed killed after the plane crashed, the sources said.

Limited Offensive Expected

The air strikes appear to reflect a general uneasiness among high-ranking South Vietnamese commanders about the Communists' plans for Military Region III, which envelops Saigon, in the dry season that is just beginning.

The tempo of small-scale fighting in the region has picked up noticeably, both sides probing and the South Vietnamese Government forces doing a considerable amount of shelling and bombing. Some South Vietnamese commanders believe that the Communists may stage a limited offensive, either to seize Tay Ninh Province or to move their ill-defined front lines even closer to Saigon.

Meanwhile, the Saigon command reported that the North Vietnamese fired 19 rockets into Cu Nanh airbase just outside Pleiku city in the Central Highlands yesterday afternoon.

Twelve servicemen and 9 dependents were injured in the 122-mm rocket attack on the airbase and a Caribou transport was damaged, the command said.

Not Believed Retaliatory

Government forces, it said, responded with helicopter gunships and howitzers that struck the Communist rocket site 5 miles west-northwest of the city, killing three soldiers.

The Communist rocket attack came after the morning raids by the South Vietnamese planes in Tay Ninh, but was probably meant to retaliate for them, the command said.

At his weekly press briefing today, Col. Vo Dong Giang, the Vietcong military spokesman here, said that he had no precise information about the rocket attack but that if it had taken place it would have been in keeping with the Oct. 15 order to Communist troops to "fight back" against South Vietnamese violations of the cease-fire.

Route 14 Effort Slowed

Pleiku has been a staging area for efforts to reopen Route 14, farther south in the central highlands, since North

Vietnamese units reportedly supported by tanks overran three Saigon Government bases near the road in Quang Duc Province.

That effort to open the road appears to have bogged down in the rugged, hilly terrain. The drive has been supported occasionally by air strikes from the Pleiku base.

With Route 14 closed in Quang Duc, several fairly remote provincial capitals have become increasingly isolated.

Gia Nghia, the tiny provincial capital of Quang Duc, appears to be cut off by road to the outside world, while farther to the southwest, Phuoc Binh now appears to be depending exclusively on supply by air.

In the last few days the Saigon command has reported Communist rocket attacks on Phuoc Binh, the capital of Phuoc Long Province. An Loc, the next-door Province capital, was left surrounded at the end of last year's Communist offensive.

Pilots Tell of Blasts

Pilots who took part in the attacks over the two Tay Ninh Province airfields, which are about 70 miles northwest of Saigon, said they saw several secondary explosions and a huge plume of smoke at Katum, indicating direct hits.

While the South Vietnamese Air Force has been almost continuously active in the last two months, the last big raids were flown Nov. 7 against Loc Ninh, a Communist administrative headquarters, in Binh Long Province and Bo Duc in Phuoc Long Province.

The Saigon command said that more than 50 sorties were flown in those raids, which it said were staged in retaliation for a rocket attack on the Bien Hoa airbase 12 miles north of Saigon.

A Government spokesman, Col. Le Trung Hien, had said that only military targets were struck in those raids. But today Colonel Giang, the Vietcong spokesman, displayed photographs that he said showed extensive damage to the Loc Ninh market, a hospital, a pagoda and a church, and numerous civilian casualties.

Takeo Shelling Goes On

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia, Nov. 24 (Reuters)—Communist-led insurgents have continued to harass the isolated provincial capital of Takeo, 40 miles south of here, with heavy mortar attacks, the Government military command said today.

Several 82-mm shells struck the city and wounded eight civilians last night, the command said. Military sources said that at least 10 people had been killed and 25 wounded in Takeo by shelling in the last

Soviet Navy Hampers U.S. Hand in Mideast

Washington.

The world we live in is no longer what it seems. At least, it is no longer what it seems to a large majority of thinking Americans. This is probably the most dangerous single feature of our current situation, and it was vividly proved last week.

To begin with, a group of seven eminent, Cambridge-based economists announced that the Arab oil boycott ought to be countered with United States sanctions, such as the cessation of food deliveries.

Now this kind of direct sanctions, as even Cambridge-based economists ought to know, must ultimately depend on military power—which is why the Arabs are so cocky.

By a splendid stroke of irony, the U.S. Navy's lonely little task force in the Indian Ocean, headed by the aircraft carrier Hancock, turned tail and steamed for home on almost the same day the Cambridge economists issued their statement.

The Hancock is so ancient that it was about to be decommissioned and handed over to the ship-breakers, when it was sent into action by President Nixon's worldwide military alert. By the time the task force was called home, it was also literally surrounded by modern Soviet guided-missile cruisers, vastly more powerful than the Hancock.

During the Yom Kippur war, the Navy also lost its parody of a naval base on the island of Bahrain in the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, the Soviet Navy has new naval bases at the head of the Persian Gulf and in Somaliland, plus other facilities in the Indian Ocean.

Thus, the Soviet Navy can keep a permanent force of 5 warships and 15 supporting vessels in the Indian Ocean, Red Sea and/or Persian Gulf, at the end of a supply line 11,000 miles long.

five days.

The command said that Government forces were continuing sweep-operations against insur-

This Soviet naval effort is quite certainly due to Soviet awareness of the overwhelming, even terrifying, strategic importance of the Arab oil states.

Hence the Cambridge-based economists, one may conclude, did not take the trouble to find out these unpleasant facts. Or, perhaps, they are not quite in their right minds.

Even Cambridge economists, after all, if both sane and informed, could not really have believed the Soviet Union would let the navally enfeebled U.S. get away with direct sanctions against the Arab oil states.

This reporter will bet five to one that just about everyone, not only these economists, will be shocked by the following facts.

When the Soviet Union threatened military intervention in the Middle East, the Joints Chiefs of Staff were of course notified.

The President warned the Russians off, by putting part of the Strategic Air Command in the air and ordering a general alert. If the Russians had ignored the President's warning, the U.S. 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean would have been the first to feel the cruel shock.

Thus the U.S. Navy's general staff was duty-bound to notify the President—and did so notify him—that the 6th Fleet was inferior and would quickly lose in a fight.

Secondly, the Soviet Union actually sent nuclear warheads to Egypt for a brief period at the same height of peril in the Middle East. The chances are that the warheads have since been removed, but it is fully confirmed that the warheads were actually sent.

These are frightening facts from that real world in which most Americans have ceased to live. Further reports on it will follow, if a hull between more pressing horrors should permit.

gents dominating several positions and hills on Route 4, which leads to the deep-sea port of Kompong Som.

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Allocating Oil 'the Military Way'

The federal agency exerting life-or-death power over the American economy through allocation of scarce gas and oil is being run by a crusty three-star admiral who privately vows the program will work "the military way" no matter what the public wants.

Vice Adm. Eli T. Reich, 60, last month quietly retired from the Navy (ending 38 years' service), left his Pentagon job as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and the next day came downtown to take over the new Office of Petroleum Allocation in the Interior Department. Since then Reich (pronounced "rich") has brought in more than 15 retired or active duty military officers (colonels and above). More are on the way.

A Prussian complexion for what is now the government's most important people program seems dubious. But beyond image, Interior Department officials question whether generals and admirals are equipped to dictate allocation and rationing with transcendent political and economic impact.

Their doubts were fueled by Adm. Reich's first days on the job. Gathering Interior Department staffers about him, Reich declared: "I don't give a damn for the public image. We're not

here to create an image. We're to do a job—my way. And that's the military way." Reich then launched into what civilians at the Interior Department describe as a series of "old sea stories."

Interior Department civilians were suddenly in coventry, cut off from what was happening. Simultaneously, the brass migration began. Navy Capt. Robert C. (Bing) Gillette became acting executive director, Air Force Lt. Col. R. D. (Deek) Hensley is Reich's administrative assistant, retired Air Force Maj. Gen. James Curtin was named director of operations.

Retired officers will be in charge of regional offices in Atlanta, Dallas and Denver. Col. James Scanlan was put in charge of personnel with a Navy captain as his deputy. A retired major general was scheduled to become permanent executive director but bowed out because of poor health. Four officers, active and retired, were assigned to the Office of Planning and Policy. And the underground railway from the Pentagon has not yet run its course.

The reason for the topside military invasion is given as dire necessity. The allocation office was struggling along with some 200 nondescript bureaucrats

detailed from the poverty program, the Agriculture Department and other departments utterly irrelevant to the energy program. With the crisis at hand, following months of White House procrastination, the office was incapable of doing the job. So, presidential counselor Melvin R. Laird suggested that Reich, an expert at military logistics, take over.

"Frankly, we had chaos," Reich told us, defending the brass as the best available talent. For instance, Col. William Steger, brought over from the Pentagon, is a recognized petroleum expert.

Reich contends that some of his retired generals will stay only six months and that, once conflict-of-interest and antitrust complications are ironed out, he plans to draw 225 persons from private industry. Moreover, high administration officials claim that Reich's army is strictly administrative.

In truth, however, it is more than that. His office is now setting priorities in the critical middle-distillate (heating fuel, jet fuel, diesel fuel, etc.) area. Whether those decisions are correct or not, some administration officials worry about the image. Interior Department bureaucrats cringed when Reich's first act in the new job was to establish top priority for the Defense Department. They fear repercussions when he allocates fuel for defense contractors at the expense of other industries.

The once warm relationship between Democratic Sen. Henry M. Jackson of Washington and the Nixon administration underwent further deterioration during the Mideast crisis, with Jackson fuming to friends that he was cut off from diplomatic information.

What incensed Jackson was the continuing ardent courtship by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of Jackson's arch foe and inveterate Nixon-balter, Sen. J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas—a fact spread around town by friends of the Foreign Relations Committee chairman.

Jackson, President Nixon's invaluable ally through the long agony of Vietnam, felt he was cut off from the information spigot because of criticism of détente and the Nixon-Kissinger handling of the Mideast crisis. Last week Kissinger finally telephoned Jackson to ask him for an appointment—but resentment endures.

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NEW YORK TIMES - 26 NOVEMBER 1973 P-14 **U.S. Reported to Have Known Coup Was Imminent in Athens**

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 25—The Nixon Administration had considerable forewarning of the coup d'état that replaced George Papadopoulos with Lieut. Gen. Phaidon Gizikis, United States officials said today.

"We were not surprised," said an official who has closely followed the military leadership since it took over the civilian government in April, 1967.

He added that rumors of a coup aimed at toppling Mr. Papadopoulos had begun last summer and had been taken seriously in Washington.

It was known, the official went on, that the plans of Mr. Papadopoulos to add "more political coloration" to his military leadership by taking in civilian politicians were viewed with growing distaste and suspicion by a number of his colleagues in the Greek military establishment.

The large-scale riots of students and workers in Athens and Salonika last week, coming a little over a month after Mr. Papadopoulos installed a civilian cabinet under the progressive politician Spyros Markezinis confirmed the suspicion of the conservative military men, the United States official added.

"The military men were

afraid Papadopoulos would blow it," he said, "and that is why they moved against him."

Timing Not Known

The Administration officials said they had no foreknowledge of the precise timing of the take-over by General Gizikis but had received strong indications that a move was imminent.

Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco and his deputy, Rodger P. Davies, went to the State Department this morning to spend the better part of the day conferring with the United States Embassy in Athens.

But officially there was "no comment" on the events, the department spokesman, Paul J. Hare, said. Nor will there be any special act of recognition of the new Athens government by the United States Government, he said.

Mr. Hare explained that over the last six months the Nixon Administration has moved away from a policy of accordant recognition to new foreign governments as a kind of blessing dispensed when the United States favors the change or withheld for a time if the change seems inimical to United States interests. The new Administration policy means that diplomatic relations continue as before.

NEW YORK TIMES 26 NOV. 1973 P-52 **Pentagon Has Paid Bonuses of \$3,500 To Keep Bandmen**

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 25 — Because the Pentagon considers them to have "critical military skills," more than 100 musicians were given an average of \$3,500 in re-enlistment bonuses last year so they would keep on playing such instruments as the piccolo, oboe and bassoon.

In disclosing today the special bonuses paid to military musicians in the last fiscal year, Representative Les Aspin of Wisconsin, a Pentagon gadfly, called the practice "the sourest note I've ever heard out of the Pentagon."

The junior member of the House Armed Services Committee asked Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger to prove that "piccolo players are vital to the national defense."

The Defense Department, which is normally eager to catch the Wisconsin Democrat in an error, had no immediate riposte. But the explanation offered by one Defense official was that it was important to military morale to keep the musicians in the service.

The musicians received the extra money under a program, started after the Korean war, permitting the military to give

special re-enlistment bonuses to enlisted men holding a "critical military skill." The bonuses vary, depending upon length of service and skill, but can go as high as \$8,000.

Mr. Aspin said the musicians' special bonuses averaged \$3,500 a man. In addition, the musicians received the regular \$1,700 bonus paid to every enlisted man who re-enlists.

Mr. Aspin, a former Pentagon analyst, suggested the military services were misusing the re-enlistment bonuses so "G.I.'s can toot horns."